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Abstract.- In this paper, I argue that the activity of translating can be found at the very core of 
philosophizing, in the experience of thinking itself. Firstly, I argue that a genuine translation entails thinking 
together with the translated author, by imagining a dialogue with him or her. Secondly, I argue that thinking 
itself is a process of translation. Starting form Plato’s and Aristotle’s depictions of thinking as dialogue, I 
argue that we can find a similar treatment of thinking in Heidegger’s analysis of the “voice of conscience”, 
and I show how the dialogue with my own conscience has a translative effect: it transports me from the 
inauthenticity of my everyday life towards my possible and better self. Thus, not only translation, but thinking 
too is a form of hospitality, the thinker being a host for his own possible self.  
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In this paper, I intend to discuss the place of translation in philosophy and to show 
that translation is not external to it: for the philosopher, translating is more than a useful 
activity. My purpose is to argue that, actually, the activity of translating can be found at the very core 
of philosophizing, that is, in the experience of thinking itself, and that translation can be considered a 
necessary moment of genuine understanding, especially the understanding of another and of 
myself. I will develop this thesis in two steps: (1) Firstly, I will elaborate on the idea that a 
good translation – at least a good philosophical translation – always entails an effort of genuine 
thinking alongside the translated author, by staging a dialogue in which the translator tries to 
imagine what the author would say about the way his thoughts are rendered. (I will give a 
concrete example of such an imagined dialogue from my own experience as co-translator 
into Romanian of Heidegger’s Vorträge und Aufsätze / Conferences and Studies, with respect to 
the Heideggerian highly difficult term Ereignis.) Of course, this dialogue should go even 
further than establishing the intentions of the author; this dialogue is not only a meeting 
between a certain author and a certain reader (i.e. the translator), but between their 
respective forms of life, as expressed by their respective languages. A good philosophical 
translation should do justice to both of them, seen as a guest language and a host language, 
whose meeting should follow the laws of hospitality. Being obliged to accommodate a 
foreigner, the host language not only enriches itself, but also reaches a better self-
understanding.  
(2) Secondly, after elaborating on the idea that a genuine translation is always a 
thoughtful one, I will argue that thinking itself is, essentially, a process of translation: it is translative. 
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That is so because the experience of thinking about something is, in its most spontaneous 
and immediate form, a dialogue between me and myself as another self – a dialogue “two-in-
one”, as Hannah Arendt calls it, in which I examine all the aspects I can imagine. 
Depictions of thinking as conversation can be found right at the beginnings of philosophy, 
in Plato and Aristotle. I will try to show, very briefly, that we can identify an interpretation 
of thinking as dialogue also in Heidegger’s analysis of “the voice of conscience” from Sein 
und Zeit. In the present context, this interpretation will be most relevant, because it can 
apply also to the way we should regard the encounter between two languages in the process 
of translating a philosophical text.  
(1) Let us begin with the idea that the translator of a philosophical text should 
make the effort of thinking together with the author, by imagining a dialogue with him, by 
asking: would he agree with the way I rendered his thoughts? The very experience of such a 
dialogue is a proof that thoughts can be translated. Against the pessimism of those who 
believe that there are untranslatable philosophers – such as Hegel, Heidegger or Derrida –, 
it should be said that what is at stake in any philosophical translation is to render thoughts, 
not dictionary words. (Many would agree with this seemingly banal idea, but not with its 
true consequences, e.g. the creation of new words in the target language.) The reference 
point should not be the generally accepted translation of a certain expression, but the 
thought it expresses. An idiomatic expression or a complicated German word might not be 
translatable, but a thought can be. Of course, an idea is always reached from within a 
certain language. In the process of translating an idea, some of it might be lost; but the 
target language might highlight another aspect of the respective thought. Those who talk 
about untranslatability of some philosophical texts still work with the unsustainable ideal of 
a perfect translation, without any loss or addition. Notwithstanding, the plurality of 
languages and the partiality of each of them are inescapable. So, what is at stake for a 
translator is to find in his own language the best word(s) to express the respective thought, 
by constructing a comparable, as Ricoeur argues1. 
By saying all these, I imply that there is a distance between thoughts and words, in 
the sense that a thought is not consumed by a certain formulation of it. This is not to be 
understood in a vulgarized Platonic fashion, thoughts being the intelligible, and words the 
sensible. We know from our experience as thinkers that we cannot have thoughts without 
words (even if we can have words without genuine thoughts). And from our experience as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In Ricoeur, P.: On Translation, translated by Eileen Brennan, with an introduction by Richard Kearney, 
London & New York, Routledge, pp. 36-37. 
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partners in dialogue we know that thoughts can be rendered in more than one way. We 
often clarify a thought by rephrasing it. Sometimes, we might think that a phrase expresses 
perfectly a certain thought, and still have to rephrase it in order to communicate it to 
somebody else, not necessarily because she has a different mother tongue, but because she 
has, perhaps, a different background or just a different way of using the same language as 
we do. Let me rephrase this, by saying that we translate not only from one language to 
another, but also within the very same language – when we try to find comparable 
formulations for the same idea. But how are we to understand this “same”? The very 
possibility of translation indicates that it cannot be grasped from a substantialist 
perspective. A Heideggerian phrase, for instance, and its various translations do not have in 
common an intrinsic quality. What brings them together is the attempt to express the same 
idea. There is no red thread binding them. Rather, they are linked to one another by being 
used in order to express that thought, as in a Wittgensteinian wool thread; they are linked 
by family resemblances. 
We cannot find the thought without the words. The general, the abstract cannot be 
found without the individual and the concrete. An idea will always be expressed in a certain 
language. However, this does not mean that other languages cannot petition the human 
reason (or reasonability) in order to express that idea. And what they can hope to offer is a 
comparable, a close kin to the original.  
I will take as an example a very important Heideggerian term: das Ereignis 
(Heidegger declared it the leading word for his thinking after 19362). The dictionary 
translation of this word is ,,event” (and the verb sich ereignen is usually translated by “to 
happen”, “to occur”). However, Heidegger uses it because he has in mind something more 
relevant philosophically. Even if “eignis” from Ereignis is etymologically derived from Auge, 
„eye”, it still has a strong connotation of eigen, „proper”, „own”.  
Heidegger uses Ereignis to indicate the genuine relationship between man and 
Being. It is about a correspondence, an Entsprechung more originary than the rapport 
between subject and object that has been so dominant since Descartes. In this latter case, 
the subject, through re-presentation, puts before him the object and subjects it to his will to 
knowledge and, ultimately, to his will to power. The often quoted maxim of this seeming 
omnipotent human will is “If you really want to do something, you can do it!”. The subject 
is active, he has the initiative, the object is passive. In the face of an omnipotent subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cf. Heidegger, M.: Wegmarken, GA 9, Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 1967, p. 316 (marginal note).  
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that wants to preserve his omnipotence, the object has no chance to essentially change the 
subject one way or another. In the hands of the modern subject, Being becomes its object, 
a disposable asset.  
In contradistinction to this simplified, strong version of the subject–object rapport, 
that still dominates our contemporary world, Heidegger tries to bring to the fore an 
altogether different relationship, one that seems to have been prominent for the ancient 
Greeks. It is about a relationship in which the “object” is the agent, so to speak. Man is 
overwhelmed by the phenomenality of the physis, of “nature”, he is struck by wonder, he is 
amazed by the pure fact that something is. For the Greek man, the world is populated with 
gods because it is full of wonders. However, these wonders would not be such if not seen 
and sang and studied by man. This is also valid for the relationship between man and 
Being: man would not be man without this special relationship to Being, given the fact that 
he can see and name the Being of the beings he encounters in nature or he creates. At the 
same time, Being needs man in order to be seen and named. They both need one another 
in order to become themselves, to gain what belongs to them in the most essential way. 
Precisely this is the sense of the prefix er: it expresses the success (as in Erfolg) in gaining 
what is proper, eigen. (Heidegger uses Ereignis also because of the folk etymology that 
connects Ereignis with eigen.) Each of the two gains his proper, his own self because of the 
other, with the help of the other. It is a close and essential reciprocity. But the protagonist of 
this relationship, i.e. the one that inaugurates it, is Being, and not man. And philosophy is, 
according to Heidegger, man’s most informed and profound answer to the call of Being to 
name it and think it.  
Given all these, when we had to find a translation for Ereignis into Romanian, the 
other co-translator of the volume Conferences and Studies into Romanian, Bogdan Mincă, 
suggested: obţinerea propriului, i.e. “obtaining what is proper to somebody or something”, 
“what is one’s own”. However, I argued that “obtaining” still reminds of the power of the 
subject to determine and, thus, to dominate the object. So, I suggested to replace the verb a 
obţine (“to obtain”) with a dobândi, which, having a Slavic origin, does not belong to the 
metaphysical realm of the Latin language and, in addition to that, has a connotation of 
“being conferred with…” or “being bestowed with…”, which reflects the initial passivity 
of the “subject”. So, our translation of Ereignis is dobândirea propriului, that is, “being 
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bestowed with one’s own self”3. Interestingly enough, the Romanian verb a dobândi comes 
from the Slavic dobyti, „to obtain”, „to gain”, which comes from the Slavic byti, „to be”, 
which pertains to the large Indo-European family of the root *bhu-, „to be”, from which 
derive the Greek phyo, physis, the Latin fio, fieri, the Romanian a fi, fost, the German bin, bist, 
or the English to be. Here is how something is lost and something else is gained: What is 
lost is the idea of “event”, of the extraordinary happening of reaching one’s self. However, 
the Romanian translation expresses the fundamental character of being bestowed with 
what is proper for oneself, given the kinship of a dobândi with “to be”: when reaching what 
is proper to one, one’s being is gained.  
Of course, Heidegger uses Ereignis in both senses: the common one, “event”, and 
the new, philosophical one, the rare and precious happening of “being bestowed with one’s 
own self”. By doing that, he proceeds in the good old fashion, inaugurated by the first 
philosophers, of taking a common, usual word and use it in a new way, that discloses and 
illuminates reality anew. The problem is that Romanian does not have a similar dual word, 
relating both to “event” and to “proper”. The easy way out would be, of course, to 
translate it with… eveniment (the Romanian for “event”); but this would be just another case 
in which “the easy way out” is also a way out of philosophy. The only solution is to leave 
aside the usual meaning and to translate directly the philosophical one. Dobândirea propriului, 
“being bestowed with one’s own self”, is one attempt to do that. One still holding the ideal 
that a translation should sound as if the text was written in the target language might say it 
is not an elegant solution. However, I think this compromise solution is a good example of 
what Ricoeur calls hospitality when describing the relationship between the languages 
involved in translation (seen as hospitality, translation must involve compromising, just like 
a host should compromise in order to accommodate a visitor). Dobândirea propriului is a 
form of hospitality because in this case the translation does not try to silently appropriate the 
meaning and pretend that the idea captured by Ereignis was thought directly in Romanian. 
If, perhaps, the Romanian version does not sound very “elegant” it is because the thought 
of “being bestowed with one’s own self” was previously thought in a different language – a 
stranger, a foreigner that has to be received in the house of the host as the foreigner, and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The English version of Ereignis offered by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly in their translation of Beiträge zur 
Philosophie / Contributions to Philosophy is more courageous than ours, because they actually created a new 
English word: enowning. The prefix “en” mirrors the German er, and “owning” expresses the connotation of 
“proper”, “own”. Of course, their translation has been highly criticised by those who believe that a 
translation should not involve such dramatic solutions and should not show itself as a translation. 
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as a  prisoner from a  defeated country. In  Venuti’s famous terms4, a  philosophical 
translation should be marked by foreignization, and not domestication – not only regarding 
the terms used, but the entire style of a translation. (Just a smal example in this respect: if 
Heidegger starts his sentences with certain words, for the sake of the argument in the text 
the translation should do the same, even if a diferent order of words would sound more 
elegant in the target language.) 
Surely,  we should  not fal into the  other extreme: the translation should  not  be 
uninteligible.  Hospitality  does  not  mean that the  host gets conquered  by the guest. It 
means that the two engage in an ongoing dialogue, a dialogue of thought. Hopefuly, this 
dialogue facilitates an Ereignis:  by acknowledging  one another in their  otherness, in their 
alterity,  both  host and guest can end  up “being  bestowed  with  one’s  own self”, that is, 
becoming themselves  by  becoming aware  of themselves, in their  diference from  one 
another.  To give just a short example,  when a  Romanian is confronted  with the task  of 
translating the way Being is captured in German, as a verbal noun: das Sein, it becomes clear 
that the Romanian language has a substantialist point of view on Being: because instead of 
a verbal noun, we most often use a mere noun: finţă5. 
In conclusion, the translator  of a  philosophical text should  not refrain from 
choosing less elegant solutions when the thought or the argument that should be translated 
cals for it. If the translation does not reflect the thinking from the original text, what’s the 
point  of translating?6 Any thoughtful act  of translation should  have a translative efect – 
especialy in the case  of an author (philosopher  or  poet)  who forces the limits  of  her 
language.  The translation should  be as  daring as the  original – or even  more,  when the 
thought that has to be translated cals for radical gestures such as the complete change of 
the  meaning  of a  word7.  By foreignization, a language  does  not lose itself,  because  no 
language can simply reflect another.  The efort in finding a comparable can involve the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Venuti, L.: The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation, London & New York, Routledge, 1995. 
5 Actualy, the Romanian comparable for Sein is the verbal noun fire; but the first translators of Heidegger 
into Romanian did not chose it, because it sounded less familiar to the common ear. Now, it would be 
dificult to change the established translation, fin . 
6 As Walter Benjamin says in “The Translator’s Task”, a translation should not be done “for readers” (“for 
readers who do not understand the original”), because neither the original text was writen for them 
(Benjamin, W.: “The Translator’s Task”, translated by Steven Rendal, in TTR: traduction, terminologie, rédaction, 
vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, p. 151). In other words, the translation of a very dificult text should not be a softer, 
lighter version of it, but a text of comparable dificulty. 
7 For example, Heidegger does this with the German das Gestel (in Heidegger, M., „Die Frage nach der 
Technik” (1953), Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-1953), GA 7, Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 2000, p. 23). He 
uses the term Gestel to designate the essence of technology, given that it literaly means the totality (Ge-) of al 
the movements of puting and placing (stelen). Usualy, Gestel means “rack” (a piece of equipment, usualy 
made of metal or wooden bars, that is used for holding things or for hanging things on). 
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most hidden depths of the target language, discovering new meanings and revitalizing old 
words.  A good example in this respect is the  Romanian translation  proposed  by  Bogdan 
Mincă for Anwesen, rendered  usualy  by prezenţă (“presence”).  His solution is adăstare 
(“awaiting”, “remaining”),  based  on the excelent corespondence  between the  German 
prefix an- and the  Romanian  prefix „ad-”,  both  meaning “coming from…, towards…”: 
something is here, present, because it came from concealment, towards disclosure.8 
(2) Now, we can make the second step in the argument in favour of the idea that 
translation is at the  very core  of  philosophizing: thinking itself is, esentialy, a proces of 
translation,  because thinking about something is, spontaneously, a dialogue between a  host 
and a guest, between me and myself as another self.  
Thinking  has  been regarded as an inner  dialogue since the  beginnings  of 
philosophy. At the end of Hippias Major, for example, Socrates says that when he wil go 
home after the discussion with Hippias about the Beautiful, he wil have to face “that man 
who is continualy refuting me”; “he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same 
house” (304d).  This “near relative” wil  be caled by later  philosophers, simply, 
“conscience” (even in the sense  of moral conscience).  From the context  of  Socrates’ 
reference to his “inner man”, we can easily deduce that he is at odds with himself when he 
does something wrongly, in this case when he talks about the Beautiful without having the 
experience of producing beautiful things. The mater of principle pertains to the ethics of 
discourse: one should not say (nor do) something that his conscience tels him is wrong. So 
Socrates indicates a fundamental  demand:  not to  be in conflict  with  oneself.  The same 
demand appears in Gorgias,  when  he tels Calicles the folowing: “I,  my  very good sir, 
should rather choose to have my lyre, or some chorus that I might provide for the public, 
out  of tune and  discordant,  or to  have any number  of  people  disagreeing  with  me and 
contradicting  me, than that I should  have internal  discord and contradiction in  my  own 
single self” (482b-c). 
In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt analyses at length the ethical implications of 
thinking understod as dialogue two-in-one9. The main idea would be that the reason for 
not  doing  wrong is the great  discomfort and  unhappiness  of living  with a  wrong-doer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The argument for this translation can be found in: Minc , B.: “Die Übersetzung von Heideggers Vorträge 
und Aufsätze ins Rumänische als ein philosophisches Gespräch mit drei anderen Sprachen (Deutsch, Latein, 
Griechisch)”, in Heideger Studies, vol. 28/2012. 
9 Cf. Arendt, H.: The Life of the Mind, vol. I: „Thinking”, ed. Mary McCarthy, New York, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1978, pp. 179-193. 
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(hence the common expression “After doing that, I could not live with myself anymore”)10. 
That is why Socrates says that “doing wrong is worse than suffering it, and escaping 
punishment worse than incurring it” (Gorgias, 474b). And that is why Aristotle says, in The 
Nicomachean Ethics, that the virtuous man “always stays in accord with himself”, does not 
quarrel with himself, so to speak; he is his own very best friend (1166a10; 1168b5). He feels 
good with himself, he likes his own company, has no regrets. Whereas the vicious person 
(if he is aware of being too weak to avoid being vicious) is in permanent disagreement with 
himself and tries to forget himself by avoiding being all alone with himself and by always 
mixing with others. He tries to avoid hearing the voice of the inner man, telling him how 
vicious he is. Only the virtuous can be friends with himself. And friendship towards oneself 
is a precondition for the friendship towards others, because genuine friendship, being 
based on mutual admiration for the other’s character, can exist only between virtuous 
people. 
As I said at the beginning, I think that also Heidegger’s analyses of “the voice of 
conscience” (die Stimme des Gewissens) from Sein und Zeit entail an interpretation of thinking 
as dialogue – precisely because Heidegger determines “the voice of conscience” as “the 
voice of the friend that each of us carries with himself”11. Well, the voice of this “friend”, 
the call of my conscience is, actually, the voice of my better, possible self, constituted by all 
my true possibilities of being. This friend calls me away from the inauthenticity of everyday 
life, towards the realisation of these possibilities, of my authentic self. From this perspective, 
thinking has, essentially, a translative dimension: it entails a transportation, a delocalization 
of my self in order to find myself. It could mean a delocalization of myself form the chains 
of a terrible and self-destructive marriage; it could mean a transportation from a limited job 
in a bank to a new life as an independent farmer or as a full-time painter. — Why is it my 
true self so foreign to me that it assumes the role of an alter? He is a foreigner not only 
because I do not know him very well (being caught in our everyday routine, I don’t usually 
spend too much time with my authentic self, that is, I don’t think too much), but also 
because he is a possible me, I am not him yet. However, he is a friend, because – having in 
mind Aristotle’s definition of friendship – he intends what is good for me. And being my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We know that, in some cases, “internal discord and contradiction” might even make somebody go mad, as 
in the case portrayed in Fritz Lang’s film from 1945, Scarlet Street: the case of the murderer who confesses his 
crime (a perfect crime), but nobody believes him (he had been too successful in leaving no trace). By not 
acknowledging his guilt, the others don’t give him the occasion to become in accord with his own conscience. 
11 In original, “[die] Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt” (Heidegger, M.: Sein und Zeit 
(1927), GA 2, Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 1977, p. 163. 
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more authentic, possible self, even if he seems foreign and coming from far away, he is in 
fact what is for me the closest. Even if, in all the noise of my everyday life, I do not hear 
his calling, he still calls me. Even if I do not know him, he lives with me in the most 
intimate intimacy. Because of this inner friend – we can also call him “conscience” –, even 
the most vicious have the possibility to change for the better. 
In conclusion, the close relationship between thinking and translation does not 
limit itself to the fact that a genuine translation is a thoughtful one, but it means also that 
genuine thinking is translatory. The translative dimension of thinking indicates that 
translation should occupy a very important place in philosophy, because it represents an 
excellent occasion to exercise this capacity implied in the silent dialogue with myself as 
another (avec moi-même comme un autre, in Ricoeur’s words): the capacity to see things from 
another’s point of view, the capacity to see even ourselves (our language, our form of life) 
from another’s point of view. This capacity to stage a dialogue with a virtual other should 
be exercised in concrete encounters with other people, fictional or not, such as Madame 
Bovary or Oblomov, my mother or my neighbour, Kant or Heidegger. Our imagination is 
limited, and its limits are narrower than the natural margins of human plurality. In other 
words, we cannot play the role of all the partners of dialogue that we should have when 
judging a certain matter. So we need real, non-imagined, surprising interlocutors. We have 
to walk on a stage that is not familiar to us, to appear in a play that we do not direct and is 
getting written while being played. This is why the dialogue of thought means also reading 
(we speak, for example, with Aristotle when we read him) and, of course, translating.  
When translating, I can be a mental host for another because, from an existential 
perspective, I am myself a guest for myself. To be a host means to be firmly rooted in my 
facticity, i.e. in what I have already done, in what I actually have; it means to be sufficiently 
sure of myself in order to receive, to welcome the stranger in my house, in my language. 
Whereas to be a guest means to be unrooted and foreign, an infinite possibility for the host 
to understand himself better and for his facticity to change. 
	  
